[seks99x]

util1.c (change_dir): Enforced --confine-root validation when changing directories so a confined server cannot chdir() outside the restricted root via .. traversal or in-tree symlinks pointing to outside directories.

receiver.c (recv_files): Extended the inplace_partial open-failure check from am_daemon to (am_daemon || confine_root) so that if opening the destination file fails under --confine-root, the receiver fails closed immediately rather than falling back or retrying unsafely.

syscall.c: Narrowed the confine_root check on pseudo-paths to confine_root && (operator_path_resolve || filesfrom_owner_walk_active()) so confinement blocks only untrusted paths rather than trusted operator paths.

testsuite/rrsync-merge-file-confine_test.py: Routed confined_pull through a remote shell wrapper (-e alias_rsh) so --confine-root applies only to the server sender instead of leaking into the local client receiver via fork() and blocking writes to the test destination.

testsuite/rsync-pseudo-path.test: Updated Test 2 to assert that --log-file=>(...) succeeds under --confine-root={base_path}, reflecting that operator-supplied kernel pipe pseudo-paths (/dev/fd/N) are trusted and permitted.

testsuite/confine-root-dest-race.test: Added regression coverage verifying that static destination escapes (../, in-tree symlinks) and live parent-swap TOCTOU races are blocked under --confine-root.

Reported-by: karimabisaad@gmail.com

[seks99x]

The sender/source is still not confined well. Only enforced under files-from. Confine-root is the same as a daemon tree and source should be also confined. Will push tomorrow.