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20 changes: 20 additions & 0 deletions README.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -244,6 +244,26 @@ When `allowedOrigins` is empty the server responds with `Access-Control-Allow-Or
}
```

### Reverse Proxy

Behind a reverse proxy every request comes from the proxy's address. To log the client's address instead, list the proxies the server should trust. Forwarding headers are read only from requests whose direct peer is one of them; by default no proxy is trusted and headers are ignored.

| Setting | Env Var | Description | Default |
|---------|---------|-------------|---------|
| `trustedProxies` | `OCAP_TRUSTEDPROXIES` | IPs or CIDR ranges of trusted reverse proxies. Comma-separated in env var. | `[]` (trust none) |
| `remoteIPHeaders` | `OCAP_REMOTEIPHEADERS` | Headers holding the client address, tried in order. Comma-separated in env var. | `["X-Forwarded-For", "X-Real-IP"]` |

`X-Forwarded-For` is read right to left: trusted proxies are skipped and the first other address is the client, since entries further left can be sent by the client itself. The access log and the handlers then see the client in `remote_addr`.

```json
"trustedProxies": ["172.18.0.0/16"]
```

**Cloudflare in front of another proxy** (e.g. Cloudflare → Traefik → OCAP): only the direct peer (Traefik) is checked against `trustedProxies`, so a header that proxy merely passes on is only as trustworthy as whoever reached it.

- Recommended: keep `X-Forwarded-For`, let the proxy pass it on (Traefik: `forwardedHeaders.trustedIPs` with [Cloudflare's ranges](https://www.cloudflare.com/ips/)) and list both the proxy and Cloudflare's ranges in `trustedProxies`. Every hop appends its peer to the chain, so a client that bypasses Cloudflare ends up as the first untrusted entry and is logged as itself.
- Simpler: `"remoteIPHeaders": ["CF-Connecting-IP"]` with only the proxy in `trustedProxies`. This header holds a single address that the proxy passes on unchecked, so let only Cloudflare reach the proxy (firewall), otherwise a client that bypasses Cloudflare can set it itself.

## Large Recording Support

### Overview
Expand Down
11 changes: 10 additions & 1 deletion cmd/ocap-webserver/main.go
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -57,6 +57,10 @@ func app() error {
logHandler := slog.NewJSONHandler(logOutput, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: logLevel})
slog.SetDefault(slog.New(logHandler))

trustedProxies, err := server.ParseTrustedProxies(setting.TrustedProxies)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Docker polls the healthcheck every 30s; keep it out of info-level logs.
healthcheckPath := strings.TrimRight(setting.PrefixURL, "/") + "/api/healthcheck"

Expand All @@ -80,7 +84,12 @@ func app() error {
fuego.WithLogHandler(logHandler),
// Replaced by server.AccessLogMiddleware.
fuego.WithLoggingMiddleware(fuego.LoggingConfig{DisableRequest: true, DisableResponse: true}),
fuego.WithGlobalMiddlewares(server.AccessLogMiddleware(healthcheckPath)),
// Each global middleware wraps the ones before it, so RealIP runs
// first and the access log and handlers see the client address.
fuego.WithGlobalMiddlewares(
server.AccessLogMiddleware(healthcheckPath),
server.RealIPMiddleware(trustedProxies, setting.RemoteIPHeaders),
),
fuego.WithoutAutoGroupTags(),
fuego.WithSecurity(server.OpenAPISecuritySchemes),
fuego.WithEngineOptions(
Expand Down
11 changes: 8 additions & 3 deletions internal/server/accesslog_test.go
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ func logEntries(t *testing.T, buf *bytes.Buffer) []map[string]any {
}

func TestAccessLogMiddleware(t *testing.T) {
trusted, err := ParseTrustedProxies([]string{"172.18.0.0/16"})
require.NoError(t, err)
handler := AccessLogMiddleware("/api/healthcheck")(
http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.URL.Path == "/missing" {
Expand All @@ -44,6 +46,8 @@ func TestAccessLogMiddleware(t *testing.T) {
w.Write([]byte("ok"))
}),
)
// Same order as main: RealIP wraps the access log.
handler = RealIPMiddleware(trusted, nil)(handler)

serve := func(path string, header http.Header) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, path, nil)
Expand All @@ -54,9 +58,9 @@ func TestAccessLogMiddleware(t *testing.T) {
return rec
}

t.Run("info logs response", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("info logs response with client address", func(t *testing.T) {
buf := captureLogs(t, slog.LevelInfo)
rec := serve("/missing", nil)
rec := serve("/missing", http.Header{"X-Forwarded-For": {"1.2.3.4"}})

entries := logEntries(t, buf)
require.Len(t, entries, 1)
Expand All @@ -65,7 +69,7 @@ func TestAccessLogMiddleware(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, "INFO", e["level"])
assert.EqualValues(t, http.StatusNotFound, e["status_code"])
assert.Equal(t, "/missing", e["path"])
assert.Equal(t, "172.18.0.2:4000", e["remote_addr"])
assert.Equal(t, "1.2.3.4", e["remote_addr"])
assert.NotEmpty(t, e["request_id"])
assert.Equal(t, e["request_id"], rec.Header().Get("X-Request-ID"))
})
Expand All @@ -86,6 +90,7 @@ func TestAccessLogMiddleware(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, "outgoing response", entries[1]["msg"])
assert.Equal(t, "DEBUG", entries[1]["level"])
assert.EqualValues(t, http.StatusOK, entries[1]["status_code"])
assert.Equal(t, "172.18.0.2:4000", entries[1]["remote_addr"])
assert.Equal(t, "req-1", rec.Header().Get("X-Request-ID"))
})
}
Expand Down
118 changes: 118 additions & 0 deletions internal/server/realip.go
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
package server

import (
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"slices"
"strings"
)

// DefaultRemoteIPHeaders are the headers read for the client address when the
// request comes from a trusted proxy and remoteIPHeaders is not configured.
var DefaultRemoteIPHeaders = []string{"X-Forwarded-For", "X-Real-IP"}

// ParseTrustedProxies parses IP addresses and CIDR ranges.
func ParseTrustedProxies(entries []string) ([]netip.Prefix, error) {
var prefixes []netip.Prefix
for _, entry := range entries {
entry = strings.TrimSpace(entry)
if entry == "" {
continue
}
if strings.Contains(entry, "/") {
p, err := netip.ParsePrefix(entry)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("trusted proxy %q: %w", entry, err)
}
// Addresses are unmapped before matching, so an IPv4-mapped
// prefix must become the equivalent IPv4 prefix.
if p.Addr().Is4In6() {
if p.Bits() < 96 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("trusted proxy %q: IPv4-mapped prefix must be at least /96", entry)
}
p = netip.PrefixFrom(p.Addr().Unmap(), p.Bits()-96)
}
prefixes = append(prefixes, p.Masked())
continue
}
a, err := netip.ParseAddr(entry)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("trusted proxy %q: %w", entry, err)
}
a = a.Unmap()
prefixes = append(prefixes, netip.PrefixFrom(a, a.BitLen()))
}
return prefixes, nil
}

type clientIPResolver struct {
trusted []netip.Prefix
headers []string
}

func (c clientIPResolver) isTrusted(a netip.Addr) bool {
a = a.Unmap()
for _, p := range c.trusted {
if p.Contains(a) {
return true
}
}
return false
}

// clientIP returns the client address from the forwarding headers, but only
// when the direct peer is a trusted proxy. Each header is read right to left:
// trusted proxies are skipped and the first untrusted address is the client,
// as anything further left could have been sent by the client itself.
func (c clientIPResolver) clientIP(r *http.Request) (string, bool) {
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
if err != nil {
host = r.RemoteAddr
}
peer, err := netip.ParseAddr(host)
if err != nil || !c.isTrusted(peer) {
return "", false
}

for _, header := range c.headers {
values := r.Header.Values(header)
if len(values) == 0 {
continue
}
items := strings.Split(strings.Join(values, ","), ",")
for i, item := range slices.Backward(items) {
ip, err := netip.ParseAddr(strings.TrimSpace(item))
if err != nil {
break // malformed header: try the next one
}
ip = ip.Unmap()
if i == 0 || !c.isTrusted(ip) {
return ip.String(), true
}
}
}
return "", false
}

// RealIPMiddleware replaces r.RemoteAddr with the client address taken from
// the forwarding headers when the request comes from a trusted proxy. With no
// trusted proxies headers are never read.
func RealIPMiddleware(trusted []netip.Prefix, headers []string) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
if len(headers) == 0 {
headers = DefaultRemoteIPHeaders
}
resolver := clientIPResolver{trusted: trusted, headers: headers}
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
if len(trusted) == 0 {
return next
}
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if ip, ok := resolver.clientIP(r); ok {
r.RemoteAddr = ip
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
146 changes: 146 additions & 0 deletions internal/server/realip_test.go
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
package server

import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"

"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)

func TestParseTrustedProxies(t *testing.T) {
prefixes, err := ParseTrustedProxies([]string{
" 172.18.0.0/16 ", "10.0.0.5", "::ffff:192.168.1.1", "fd00::/8", "",
"::ffff:172.19.0.2/128", "::ffff:172.20.0.0/112", "::ffff:0.0.0.0/96",
})
require.NoError(t, err)
got := make([]string, len(prefixes))
for i, p := range prefixes {
got[i] = p.String()
}
assert.Equal(t, []string{
"172.18.0.0/16", "10.0.0.5/32", "192.168.1.1/32", "fd00::/8",
"172.19.0.2/32", "172.20.0.0/16", "0.0.0.0/0",
}, got)

for _, bad := range []string{"proxy.local", "10.0.0.0/33", "300.1.1.1", "::ffff:0.0.0.0/95"} {
_, err := ParseTrustedProxies([]string{bad})
assert.Error(t, err, bad)
}
}

func TestRealIPMiddleware(t *testing.T) {
trusted, err := ParseTrustedProxies([]string{"172.18.0.0/16", "10.0.0.1"})
require.NoError(t, err)

tests := []struct {
name string
trusted []string
headers []string
remoteAddr string
set map[string][]string
wantAddr string
}{
{
name: "no trusted proxies ignores headers",
trusted: []string{},
remoteAddr: "172.18.0.2:4000",
set: map[string][]string{"X-Forwarded-For": {"1.2.3.4"}},
wantAddr: "172.18.0.2:4000",
},
{
name: "untrusted peer ignores headers",
remoteAddr: "8.8.8.8:4000",
set: map[string][]string{"X-Forwarded-For": {"1.2.3.4"}},
wantAddr: "8.8.8.8:4000",
},
{
name: "trusted peer uses X-Forwarded-For",
remoteAddr: "172.18.0.2:4000",
set: map[string][]string{"X-Forwarded-For": {"1.2.3.4"}},
wantAddr: "1.2.3.4",
},
{
name: "spoofed left entries are skipped",
remoteAddr: "172.18.0.2:4000",
set: map[string][]string{"X-Forwarded-For": {"9.9.9.9, 1.2.3.4, 10.0.0.1"}},
wantAddr: "1.2.3.4",
},
{
name: "multiple header lines are joined",
remoteAddr: "172.18.0.2:4000",
set: map[string][]string{"X-Forwarded-For": {"9.9.9.9", "1.2.3.4"}},
wantAddr: "1.2.3.4",
},
{
name: "all entries trusted gives leftmost",
remoteAddr: "172.18.0.2:4000",
set: map[string][]string{"X-Forwarded-For": {"172.18.0.9, 10.0.0.1"}},
wantAddr: "172.18.0.9",
},
{
name: "malformed header falls back to next header",
remoteAddr: "172.18.0.2:4000",
set: map[string][]string{"X-Forwarded-For": {"garbage"}, "X-Real-IP": {"5.6.7.8"}},
wantAddr: "5.6.7.8",
},
{
name: "no header keeps RemoteAddr",
remoteAddr: "172.18.0.2:4000",
wantAddr: "172.18.0.2:4000",
},
{
name: "configured header only",
headers: []string{"CF-Connecting-IP"},
remoteAddr: "172.18.0.2:4000",
set: map[string][]string{"X-Forwarded-For": {"9.9.9.9"}, "Cf-Connecting-Ip": {"2001:db8::1"}},
wantAddr: "2001:db8::1",
},
{
name: "IPv4-mapped peer and client are unmapped",
remoteAddr: "[::ffff:10.0.0.1]:4000",
set: map[string][]string{"X-Forwarded-For": {"::ffff:1.2.3.4"}},
wantAddr: "1.2.3.4",
},
{
name: "IPv4-mapped /128 trusted entry",
trusted: []string{"::ffff:172.18.0.2/128"},
remoteAddr: "[::ffff:172.18.0.2]:4000",
set: map[string][]string{"X-Forwarded-For": {"1.2.3.4"}},
wantAddr: "1.2.3.4",
},
{
name: "IPv4-mapped subnet trusted entry",
trusted: []string{"::ffff:172.18.0.0/112"},
remoteAddr: "172.18.0.2:4000",
set: map[string][]string{"X-Forwarded-For": {"1.2.3.4, 172.18.5.5"}},
wantAddr: "1.2.3.4",
},
}

for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
tp := trusted
if tt.trusted != nil {
tp, err = ParseTrustedProxies(tt.trusted)
require.NoError(t, err)
}
var gotAddr string
h := RealIPMiddleware(tp, tt.headers)(http.HandlerFunc(func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
gotAddr = r.RemoteAddr
}))

req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = tt.remoteAddr
for k, vs := range tt.set {
for _, v := range vs {
req.Header.Add(k, v)
}
}
h.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req)

assert.Equal(t, tt.wantAddr, gotAddr)
})
}
}
11 changes: 11 additions & 0 deletions internal/server/setting.go
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -33,6 +33,11 @@ type Setting struct {
Auth Auth `json:"auth" yaml:"auth"`
HttpServer HttpServer `json:"httpServer" yaml:"httpServer"`
CORS CORSConfig `json:"cors" yaml:"cors"`

// TrustedProxies lists the reverse proxies (IPs or CIDR ranges) whose
// RemoteIPHeaders are believed. Empty: headers are ignored.
TrustedProxies []string `json:"trustedProxies" yaml:"trustedProxies"`
RemoteIPHeaders []string `json:"remoteIPHeaders" yaml:"remoteIPHeaders"`
}

type Conversion struct {
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -117,6 +122,8 @@ func NewSetting() (setting Setting, err error) {
viper.SetDefault("tmp", "")
viper.SetDefault("logger", false)
viper.SetDefault("logLevel", "info")
viper.SetDefault("trustedProxies", []string{})
viper.SetDefault("remoteIPHeaders", DefaultRemoteIPHeaders)
viper.SetDefault("customize.enabled", false)
viper.SetDefault("customize.websiteURL", "")
viper.SetDefault("customize.websiteLogo", "")
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -169,6 +176,10 @@ func NewSetting() (setting Setting, err error) {
return
}

if _, err = ParseTrustedProxies(setting.TrustedProxies); err != nil {
return
}

// Viper can't unmarshal a JSON string env var into map[string]string,
// so parse OCAP_CUSTOMIZE_CSSOVERRIDES manually if set. Env var takes
// precedence over config file.
Expand Down
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